Shutting Down GSG Project-Specific Mailing Lists
Thank you to everyone who has been a part of the GSG project mailing lists. We at Great Scott Gadgets appreciate all of the conversations and friendships that have been forged on these lists. Over the last few years we have not given our project-specific mailing lists the attention they deserve; instead we have been focusing our efforts on Discord and GitHub. As such, we will be disabling all the mailing lists except for GSG-announce. Links to the mailing list archives for Ubertooth, YARD Stick One, GreatFET One, and HackRF will all remain available on their individual product pages. Current links to the archives are here:
Tools of the KNOB Attack
This week at USENIX three researchers published information about a new attack against classic Bluetooth. Known as KNOB, the attack takes advantage of a weakness in the Bluetooth specification to force target Bluetooth connections to use 8-bit encryption keys instead of larger keys that would be resilient against brute-force attack.
This weakness in classic Bluetooth (not Bluetooth Low Energy) is a big one. I don’t recall seeing such a significant vulnerability in Basic Rate Bluetooth security since pairing was improved with the introduction of Secure Simple Pairing in Core Specification v2.1 in 2007.
One of the things that intrigued me when I heard about the KNOB attack this week was that it sounded very familiar. After chatting with Dominic Spill, we’re pretty sure we discussed the potential for this attack about ten years ago. I’m fairly certain that I had highlighted Encryption Key Size Request in a printed copy of the specification around that time.
What we didn’t have back then was a way to test for this vulnerability. The specification allows for devices to reject key sizes they consider too small, and I guessed at the time that vendors would enforce a more reasonable minimum key size than the smallest (1 byte) allowed by the specification. As demonstrated this week by Daniele Antonioli, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, and Kasper B. Rasmussen, I was wrong!
In order to test this attack it is necessary to modify the behavior of the Link Manager, the part of a Bluetooth chip that creates logical links with other Bluetooth devices. The Link Manager Protocol (LMP) is the low layer protocol that Link Managers use to communicate with one another and negotiate things including encryption for protection of higher layer protocols. LMP messages are not visible over the Host Controller Interface (HCI) that carries information between a Bluetooth chip and an application processor. If you only have the ability to control a Bluetooth chip by modifying an Operating System driver, you can alter behavior at the HCI level but not the LMP level. Ten years ago I was working on creating tools for monitoring Bluetooth signals, and I used off-the-shelf Bluetooth adapters for security testing, but I didn’t have any tools capable of active attacks below the HCI layer.
Last year things changed when Dennis Mantz released InternalBlue along with his award winning master’s thesis. Dennis reverse engineered the firmware of a popular Bluetooth chip and with InternalBlue provided a method to alter the firmware, enabling modification of Link Manager behavior for the first time. Since then Dennis and Jiska Classen have published a series of papers and presentations demonstrating powerful uses of this important tool.
It was InternalBlue that enabled the KNOB researchers to test attacks against key size negotiation for the first time. They used InternalBlue to implement a man-in-the-middle attack that inserted requests for a key size of one byte and successfully demonstrated the attack against nearly every Bluetooth device they tested. This weakness existed in the Bluetooth specification for twelve years, but nobody had tools to test it. Once a tool became available, KNOB was discovered within a year.
Another tool used by the KNOB researchers was Ubertooth One, the open source Bluetooth monitoring platform I designed almost a decade ago. They used Ubertooth One to eavesdrop on encrypted packets in order to prove the weakness of the encryption after forcing a key size of one byte. They correctly point out in their paper that Ubertooth One lacks an effective ability to follow the hopping sequence of classic Bluetooth connections (it is better at this with Bluetooth Low Energy, thanks to Mike Ryan), but they worked around that problem by capturing a single packet and then iterating over all possible clock values to interpret the packet. This ingenuity allowed them to use the low cost Ubertooth One instead of a Bluetooth analyzer costing tens of thousands of dollars.
The KNOB researchers demonstrated that Wright’s Law still holds true after all these years:
“Security will not get better until tools for practical exploration of the attack surface are made available." –Josh Wright